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STATEMENT OF THE CASF 
Nature Of The Case 
James Edwards Jones appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty 
pleas to felony domestic violence in the presence of a child and felony 
intimidating a witness. Jones claims the district court (1) erred in denying his 
motion to modify the no contact order entered against him, and (2) abused its 
sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Jones battered and strangled his girlfriend, Christina, in the presence of 
their one-year-old child, L.J., as Christina attempted to leave their residence. 
(PSI, p.3; R., p.49.) Jones fractured Christina's ribs during the attack. (11/1/2013 
Tr., p.11, Ls.9-13.) The state charged Jones with domestic violence in the 
presence of a child and attempted strangulation. (R., pp.5-6.) The same day the 
state filed criminal charges, the court entered a no contact order that prohibited 
Jones from contacting Christina, L.J., and E.B. (R., p.9.) 
While in custody on the domestic violence and strangulation charges, 
Jones asked his sister to offer Christina money in exchange for her agreement 
not to cooperate in the prosecution of Jones' criminal case and Jones indicated 
he would harm Christina and her family if she testified. (R, p.49.) Jones 
engaged in similar intimidation tactics by writing a letter to Christina, offering her 
money and threatening her if she appeared in court. (PSI, pp.4, 86-89; R., p.49.) 
As a result, on September 25, 2013, the state filed an Amended Complaint, 
which included an additional charge of felony intimidating a witness. (R., pp.19-
1 
21.) After Jones was bound over on the three felony charges, the state 
requested leave to file an Information Part II, which alleged Jones is a persistent 
violator. (R., pp.31-32.) 
On October 7, 2013, Jones filed a motion to modify the no contact order'to 
allow contact between [himself] and his daughter;' L.J. (R., p.34.) The court 
considered Jones' motion to modify the no contact order at a hearing on 
November 1, 2013, at which Jones, pursuant to a plea agreement, pied guilty to 
felony domestic violence in the presence of a child and felony intimidating a 
witness, and the state agreed to dismiss the attempted strangulation charge and 
its request to file the persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.41-48; see 
generally 11/1/2013 Tr.) The court denied Jones' motion to modify. (R., p.41; 
11/1/2013 Tr., p.17, Ls.3-5.) The court, however, amended the no contact order 
at sentencing to include only Christina and L.J. as the protected parties 1 and to 
extend the no contact order to January 6, 2024. (R., p.57; 1/7/2014 Tr., p.31, 
Ls.12-25.) The court also imposed a unified 10-year sentence with five years 
fixed on the domestic violence charge, to run concurrent to a sentence imposed 
on Jones in a separate case, and an indeterminate five-year sentence for 
attempted strangulation to run consecutive to the domestic violence sentence. 
(R., pp.60-63.) 
1 E.B., who was listed in the original no contact order, presumably refers to 
Christina's other daughter. (See PSI, p.4.) L.J., who is Jones' biological daughter 
and who remains protected by the no contact order, was two years-old at the 
time of sentencing. (1/7/2014 Tr., p.9, Ls.4-7.) 
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The day after sentencing, Jones fiied a motion to further modify the order 
with respect to L.J. to allow contact "by phone, video, mail and in person with the 
facilitation of such visits through the help of his sister:2 (R., p.66.) The court 
denied the motion. (R., p.71.) Jones subsequently filed a Rule 35 motion, which 
the court also denied. 
(augmentation).) 
(R., pp.77; Order Denying Rule 35 Motion 
Jones filed a notice of appeal timely from the Judgment. (R., pp.60, 72-
74.) 
2 It appears Jones attempted to request a modification at sentencing but the 
court declined to consider any additional amendments to the no contact order at 
that time because the victim was not present; however, the court advised Jones 
that it "would entertain a motion to reconsider or to further change or modify the 




1. the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Jones's motion to modify the amended no contact order? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it essentially 
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years 
fixed, upon Mr. Jones following his guilty plea to felony domestic 
violence in the presence of a child and felony intimidating a 
witness? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Jones's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a reduction of 
sentence? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court decline to consider Jones' claim that the district 
court erred in denying his motion to amend the no contact order since his motion 
to modify was not based on the same argument he asserts on appeal and 
nothing prohibits Jones from requesting modification on the grounds he now 
alleges? 
2. Has Jones failed to show the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion either by imposing an aggregate 15-year sentence with five years fixed 
for felony domestic violence in the presence of a child and felony witness 
intimidation or by denying his request for sentencing relief? 
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This Court Should Decline To Consider Jones' Claim That The Court Erred In 
Denying His Motion To Modify The No Contact Order Because His Argument Is 
Not Preserved And The Fundamental Error Standard Does Not Apply In This 
Context 
A. Introduction 
Jones claims the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion 
to modify the no contact order, arguing, for the first time on appeal, that "the 
denial unconstitutionally interferes with [his] fundamental right as L.J.'s parent:' 
(Appellanfs Brief, p.7.) Jones acknowledges he did not seek modification based 
on the alleged constitutional violation he now asserts but argues his claim may 
still be considered under the fundamental error standard. (Appellanfs Brief, p. 7.) 
Jones is incorrect. While this Court can consider unobjected-to error for the first 
time on appeal under the three-part fundamental error test, the test has no 
application when a procedure exists that allows the district court to consider the 
error asserted. Because Jones may request amendment of the no contact order 
on the grounds he now asserts, he should be required to do so and, until he does 
so, this Court should decline to consider his claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
'The decision whether to modify a no contact order is within the sound 
discretion of the district court." State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 771, 229 P.3d 
374, 376 (2010). 
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C. Jones' No Contact Order Claim Is Not Subject To The Fundamental Error 
Standard Of Review 
n no 
L.J. "by phone, video, mail and in person visits." (R., p.66.) At the hearing on 
Jones' motion, Jones repeated the nature of his request and asked for"contact by 
phone, mail or video," and in-person visits facilitated by Jones' sister if L.J.'s 
mother"change[d] her mind' and agreed to such visits. (2/19/2014 Tr., p.6, L.18-
p.7, L.4.) At no point did Jones claim, as he does now, that the no contact order 
violates his constitutional rights as a father. (Compare R., p.66, 2/19/2014 Tr. 
with Appellanfs Brief, pp.7-11.) 
Although Jones concedes he never requested modification of the no 
contact order on any constitutional basis, he claims the district court "abused its 
discretiori' by denying a request he never made. (Appellanfs Brief, p.7.) Jones 
cannot establish an abuse of discretion under such circumstances. Indeed, 
although Jones frames the issue as one of discretion, his actual argument is 
predicated on a claim of constitutional error for which he invokes the fundamental 
error standard of review. This standard allows an appellate court to apply a 
three-part test to consider a claim of error that the defendant did not preserve in 
the trial court. This three-part test was articulated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010), and requires the defendant to show (1) a 
violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) plain error; and (3) that the error 
affected his substantial rights, "meaning (in most instances) that it must have 
affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings:' While Jones contends he 
can satisfy this three-part test, application of the test is improper in this case. 
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Application of the fundamental error test allows a defendant to avoid the 
general rule that an appellate court will not consider claims raised for the first 
time on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. This limitation on 
appellate review encourages parties to timely raise claims in the trial court, which 
is in the best position to address them. ~ (citations omitted). Review under the 
fundamental error doctrine balances these policy considerations against a 
defendant's right to due process and allows for relief only where the defendant 
can satisfy all three prongs of the fundamental error test. ~ Implicit in the 
purpose of the fundamental error test is recognition that some errors, regardless 
of whether they are preserved, are worthy of consideration for the first time on 
appeal in order to protect the defendant's constitutional rights because, in most 
instances, there is no other avenue to raise the claims. Jones' claim of error is 
not the type of error the fundamental error test is designed to address because it 
is a claim that he can still raise in the district court. 
There is no rule or statute that prevents Jones from filing another motion 
to modify the no contact order on the basis he now asserts. In fact, at the 
hearing on Jones' motion, the district court advised that it would revisit its order if 
a "court of competent jurisdiction' issued an order governing visitation. (2/19/2014 
Tr., p.10, Ls.16-20.) If Jones can establish an actual parental right to visitation, 
the district court would undoubtedly grant his request. At a minimum, the district 
court should be given the opportunity to do so before Jones is allowed to 
complain that it abused its discretion by not doing something Jones never asked 
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it to do and this Court should decline to consider Jones' claim under the guise of 
fundamental error. 
Even if the Court considers Jones' claim under the rubric of fundamental 
error it fails because he cannot establish a constitutional violation. Although 
Jones cites authority for the general proposition that parents have a fundamental 
right to parent their children (Appellanfs Brief, p.8), he cites no authority to 
support any claim that the court must force Christina to facilitate contact between 
Jones and L.J. Unless and until Jones establishes some legal right to such 
contact, his rights as a parent are not violated. 
Further, inclusion of L.J. in the no contact order was appropriate under the 
circumstances of this case. The evidence before the court showed that Jones 
repeatedly abused L.J.'s mother, Christina, and did so in L.J.'s presence. (PSI, 
pp.4-5, 15, 50, 78-83.) Jones even admitted to the presentence investigator that 
his behavior was "probably pretty traumatic' for his daughter' and noted that Child 
Protective Services removed L.J. from the home for three weeks following Jones' 
arrest. (PSI, p.11.) Also of concern is Jones' history of using family members to 
try and manipulate Christina. (PSI, p.84.) Because Jones could use contact with 
L.J. to renew his efforts, prohibiting contact absent evidence that contact 
between L.J. and Jones would be in L.J.'s best interest was appropriate. Jones 
has therefore failed to show clear error or prejudice. 
This Court should decline to consider Jones' constitutional claim, but even 
if considered, the claim fails. 
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II 
Jones Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. introduction 
Jones claims the district court abused its sentencing discretion by 
'\3ssentially' imposing a unified 15-year sentence with five years fixed and by 
denying his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-17.) Both of Jones' 
arguments fail. The record supports the district court's sentences and its decision 
not to reduce those sentences in light of the allegedly new information that Jones 
desires treatment and has taken steps toward rehabilitation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Marks, 156 Idaho 559, _, 328 P.3d 539, 547 (Ct. App. 2014). 
C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Imposed Sentence 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002). It is presumed the fixed portion of the sentence will be 
the defendant's probable term of confinement. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d 
at 391 (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a 
sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 
577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 
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27 (2000)). To demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion, the appellant must show 
the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 
Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears 
necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. kL. The 
protection of society is, and must always be, the ultimate goal of any sentence. 
State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956). Accordingly, 
appellate courts must take into account'the nature of the offense, the character of 
the offender, and the protection of the public interest:' State v. Hopper, 119 Idaho 
606, 608, 809 P.2d 467, 469 (1991); see also I.C. § 19-2521. 
The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 15 years with five years 
fixed. (R., pp.60-63.) Jones claims his sentences are excessive because, he 
contends, 'the district court did not give adequate consideration to mitigating 
factors'.' (Appellanfs Brief, p.12.) "Specifically;' Jones argues, 'the district court did 
not adequately consider [Jones'] difficult childhood;' "mental health issues," 
'substance abuse problems," and desire for treatment. (Appellanfs Brief, pp.12-
15.) Presumably Jones believes the district courfs consideration of these factors 
was necessarily inadequate because the court did not impose some lesser 
sentence, which must mean the sentence Jones requested, 15 years with 18 
months fixed (1/7/2014 Tr., p.20, Ls.1-4), instead of five months fixed. The fact 
that the court imposed more fixed time than Jones requested does not show the 
court failed to "adequately consider'' any mitigating information or that it otherwise 
abused its discretion. In fact, the record shows the district court "adequately 
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consider[edJ' all the factors Jones recites and properly exercised its discretion in 
imposing a five-year fixed term as opposed to the 18 month term Jones 
requested. 
At sentencing, the court stated it"considered the arguments of counsel,"'the 
presentence materials," and Jones' allocution. (1/7/2014 Tr., p.21, Ls.20-24.) 
Those items included all the mitigating information Jones cites on appeal. (See 
1/7/2014 Tr., p.16, L.23 - p.20, L.23 (counsefs argument highlighting Jones' 
mental health issues, difficult childhood, substance abuse issues, and Jones' 
desire to "get a handle on his addictiori' and "better himself'); PSI, p.15 (Jones 
expressing desire for treatment to presentence investigator); 1/17/2014 Tr., p.21, 
Ls.4-7 (Jones apologizing for what he "ha[s] done' and "ask[s] for help').) The court 
also expressly acknowledged Jones' difficult childhood, his "significant mental 
health diagnoses;' and his "substance abuse issues:' (1/17/2014 Tr., p.23, Ls.4-
10, p.25, Ls.5-23.) However, the court appropriately weighed those factors 
against a number of aggravating circumstances. Specifically, the court was 
concerned by Jones' violent behavior in this case and the history of violence 
between Jones and Christina, Jones' lengthy criminal record, the fact that Jones 
was placed in the "high risk category' on the LSIR, and the domestic evaluator's 
conclusions that Jones is "minimizing the current incident and pasts violence;' is 
'hot motivated to accept responsibility for his violence suggesting that he would 
not be appropriate for community based treatment;' and is a "high risk to reoffend:' 
(1/7/2014 Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.23, L.3, p.24, Ls.11-14, p.26, L.6 - p.27, L.8.) 
Considering the objectives of sentencing, the nature of the offense, and Jones' 
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history, the court imposed an aggregate 15-year sentence with five years fixed. 
(See 1/7/2014 Tr., p.28, L.6-p.30, L.10.) Jones' claim that the district court did 
not "adequately consider' the information presented at sentencing is without merit 
and his claim that the court abused its discretion fails. 
D. The Information Jones Submitted In Support Of His Rule 35 Motion Does 
Not Warrant A Reduction Of His Sentences 
Jones also claims the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
Rule 35 motion. (Appellanfs Brief, pp.15-17.) Application of the law to the facts 
shows otherwise. 
A motion for reduction of sentence under !.C.R. 35 is a plea for leniency 
that is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 
319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006). In pursuing Rule 35 relief, the defendant must 
show the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information 
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. State v. 
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In reviewing the grant 
or denial of a Rule 35 motion, this Court considers the entire record and applies 
the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original 
sentence. State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 22, 740 P.2d 63, 64 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Three months after the court entered judgment, Jones filed a Rule 35 
motion requesting "leniency' in the form of"a reduction to 2 + 8:' (R., p.77.) Jones 
supplemented his motion with a note listing the programs he was participating in 
and advising the court he was working in the kitchen; Jones also submitted "kites' 
he had written regarding his efforts in prison. (Addendum to Defendanfs Motion 
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Pursuant to ICR 35, filed April 9, 2014 (augmentation).) The court denied Jones' 
motion, stating: 
In imposing sentence, the Court considered the four factors 
set forth in State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. 
App. 1982). Among other things, the Court was concerned by the 
seriousness of these offenses and Defendant's lengthy prior record 
which included several felony convictions. The Court 
acknowledges the Defendant's performance while incarcerated and 
his efforts at rehabilitation including mental health and anger 
management programs. While rehabilitation was a consideration 
for the Court in imposing sentence, the other Toohi/1 factors of 
punishment, deterrence and, especially, protection of society were 
also considered. Based upon all the information available, the 
Court does not find its sentence to be unduly severe. 
(Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, p.2 (augmentation).) 
Jones' involvement in programming and work while incarcerated is 
predsely what the court recommended at sentencing and in its judgment. 
(1/7/2014 Tr., p.32, L.20- p.33, L.9; R., p.62.) That Jones complied with the 
court's recommendations hardly constitutes new information for purposes of Rule 
35, and even if it does, such compliance did not warrant a reduced sentence. 
Jones has failed to show otherwise. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district courfs 
judgment and sentence and the court's order denying Jones' motion to modify the 
no contact order. 
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2014. 
J~~~fA M. LORELLO 
D~ Attorney General 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of October, 2014, served a 
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